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The rule of conquest came to receive different applications for different parts of the 
British Empire. How this happened, and who was responsible for it happening, are the 
interests of this article. Calling upon court reports, parliamentary records, and 
correspondence between various officeholders in the early Hanoverian government, 
attention will be drawn in particular to the attorney general and the solicitor general 
(the law officers of the crown) and the advice they offered upon the governance of 
colonies between 1719 and 1774. Focusing upon the conventions that pertain to war 
and conquest in Ireland, the Caribbean, India, and North America, this article reveals 
inconsistency in doctrine, but consistency in the procedures by which law officers of 
the crown acquired influence over proceedings in the houses of parliament and in the 
courts of common law and equity. Just as often in their formal capacities as in their 
informal capacities, the attorney general and the solicitor general were pivotal to the 
development of the imperial constitution, in constant response, as they were, to the 
peculiar demands of various colonies and plantations in the British Empire.  
 
Keywords: imperial constitution; crown law officers; conquest; British Empire; Ireland; 





One is able to account fully enough for the English imperial constitution of the period between 
1603 and 1714 by referring only to words that begin with the letter c. One can think first of the 
crown, and then all of the formats to which its graces were lent: councils, committees, courts, 
corporations, and Commons. Over some of these entities, the crown retained great influence, 
just short of total power; over others, the crown had negligible influence, just short of total 
powerlessness.1 Casting forward to the period between 1794 and 1914, one mainly has to come 
to terms with the colonial office and the civil servants posted to it, along with its secretarial 
presence in the ministry and parliament, to account for the imperial constitution – an imperial 
constitution that was fine-tuned in commissioned reports and dispatches, but instrumentalised 
through orders in council and statutes.2 Between 1714 and 1794, after the age of personal 
power but before the age of bureaucratic power, one encounters a different constitutional 
setting again: an extraordinarily political one. The clout of monarchical power had been 
dullened, but still endured under the first three Georges. Officeholders did far more of the 
crown’s bidding for empire in this period, as they took on greater responsibilities in accordance 
with new, if changing, standards of accountability. Parliamentarians made big declarations of 
the power of their own institution, bluffs seldom called, while judges talked of rights and 
liberties, less frightful than previous generations had been, of the king’s displeasure.3  
 
If this, for Frederick Madden and David Fieldhouse, was the ‘classical period’ of the British 
Empire, which saw plenty of ‘dynamic change’ in ‘periods of apparent stability or equipoise’, 
where might one look for its constitution taking shape?4 Should it be the Board of Trade, akin 
to a standing committee of lords, selectable from the Privy Council? Or should it be parliament, 
which consulted the Board of Trade as something of an advisory body, and was developing the 
bigger legislative agenda for all things maritime and mercantile in this period? If so, which part 
of parliament, it follows to ask, had the strongest grip on constitutional matters of empire? Was 
it the Commons as a voting assembly, or was it the Lords as its moderator, or was it the king’s 
ministers, some in cabinet with secretaries of state and, between 1768 and 1782, a dedicated 
colonial secretary? What, then, about the judiciary? Were the common law courts of Common 
Pleas and King’s Bench, hearing actions in private law from the colonies, any real standard 
bearers, or was it the Privy Council, functioning as a court of appeal in receipt of numerous 
queries on complicated points of jurisdiction, that held the greater sway? Maybe it was the 
Admiralty, hearing prize cases and instances in accordance with its own flexible jurisprudence, 
that did more? Or perhaps Chancery, that slow-moving court of discretionary equity where the 
Lord Chancellor presided over the thorniest disputes within and between colonies, set out the 
most lasting criteria for imperial matters? 
 
Thinking about the influence of each of these institutional entities separately is an interesting 
exercise, but little distance is gone by measuring one against another. That is because often 
they worked together to fashion out the Hanoverian imperial constitution. Any serious 
suggestion otherwise moves back towards a historiographical trend that continues to see 
historians succumb to the temptation of maligning as ‘unconstitutional’ the operation of some 
component or other of this system (usually, either to prove or disprove that the American 
revolution was justified). Divesting from an accusatory style of juridical history, the kind made 
classic by Charles Howard McIlwain, we might rather remove the word unconstitutional from 
our lexicon and say instead that all workings of the British Empire were constitutional if 
sometimes inconsistent.5 It follows from this that more of our attention can fix upon the 
contexts inside of which legal ideas were made malleable, compliant with differing standards 
of consistency. Now, from here, what this essay will explore is the work behind the scenes, and 
across these institutional entities, of a particular set of officeholders. 
 
Attorney general and solicitor general were the two foremost law officers of the crown. 
Brought into constitutional existence as personal counsel capable of appearing for the monarch, 
they had evolved, by the end of the seventeenth century, to become the legal advisors for the 
crown in most of its capacities: in ministry, in council, in parliament, in court.6 Necessarily 
chameleonic, the best of them shared the same traits: they were familiar with all forms of law 
practised before the judiciary, they were sensitive to the politics of the time, they were loyal to 
the crown, and they were aloof to give the appearance of remove. The solicitor general was 
underling to the attorney general, and while this did not automatically confer blindness of 
deference, the job was easier for both of them when they got along. Called upon to perform the 
same duties, they collaborated on many things, and almost always they arrived at the same 
legal interpretations, if however differently, sometimes, they got there. Sometimes their work 
was of a very informal nature. Passed a legalistic query, say, from a borough or a plantation, 
the attorney general and solicitor general were expected to form an opinion without ceremony, 
doctrine, or long lists of precedent. This was guidance and benediction, rather than law.7 
Sometimes their work was formal, however. Whenever touchy disputes concerning the interest 
of the government went to trial in one of the superior courts, the attorney general or solicitor 
general, and sometimes both depending on the case, were appointed to counsel. Whenever the 
politics of parliament got heated on a matter of constitutional principle, the law officers of the 
crown were always to be found lurking around as well, with their direct involvement as legal 
authorities ensured by the convention that at least one of them (and, with increasing likelihood, 
both) sat in the House of Commons. In turn, and what is particularly interesting about this 
period, members in the Commons came to look upon them as their own lawyers, and would 
often send them bills for drafting, editing, or commentary. As a result, as ministers, members, 
and counsel all at once, the line between colleague and client was always blurred for the law 
officers of the crown (a point made particularly well by R. A. Melikan).8 Often they fell prey 
to ‘immediate political influence’ (a point driven home by E. P. Thompson in Whigs and 
Hunters).9 And always, throughout this period, they participated in a great game of musical 
chairs. Usually the attorney general and solicitor general vied with each other for a higher 
position like Lord Chancellor or Chief Justice. This was a career trajectory that demanded a 
very different kind of personal loyalty to those who took a seat in the Commons with other 
professional motivations in mind; and it was a trajectory which ensured that every single rung 
upon the ladder, in view of Westminster Hall, had to be grasped gently.10 For those who made 
it, stellar careers sat waiting at the top; just as often, however, dishonourable reputations 
collected along the way impeded their progression upwards.11 
 
Law officers of the crown were confounded regularly with new legal questions darted in from 
the outskirts of the British Empire. The points of law differed vastly from place to place. In 
Ireland, popular nostalgia for a Catholic monarch, combined with demands for greater 
parliamentary autonomy, demanded fresh equivocation on the conquered status of England’s 
closest overseas dependency. In the Caribbean, where plantations were collected through a 
succession of wars and settlements, the royal prerogative poised itself awkwardly in relation to 
legislatively autonomous slaveholding societies. In India, crown and parliament followed a 
corporation deep into the politics of the country, which was justified through an innovative 
brand of legalism vesting the East India Company with a proxy state personality that was to be 
regulated in the interests of ‘the public’. From the mainland settlements of the Atlantic, subjects 
of the crown called sometimes for the legislative interventions of parliament while at other 
times spurning the same, inconsistency which, in turn, called into question the justice and 
choosiness of parliamentary proceeding. This article will show how all of these crises together 
– for they cannot be removed from each other – pushed the chambers of parliament and the 
courts of law to reach new conclusions about conquest: who it was for, and what it entailed. 
There was plenty of inconsistency about these conclusions, especially when it came to the 
colonial applications they were to receive, it is shown. The other contribution of this article, 
offered more for constitutional historians, is to reveal how a bridge between parliament and the 
judiciary was actively laid by the solicitor general and the attorney general in both their formal 
and informal capacities, as well as their past and present capacities, in this period. 
 
II. Omens from the Atlantic  
  
A young lawyer for the borough of Lewes, Philip Yorke, got a special sense of the shape of 
controversies to come from the Atlantic as a law officer of the crown long before becoming 
Lord Hardwicke. Indeed, he had been rewarded with the position of solicitor general thanks to 
his calculated showing of faith in a bill unrivalled, at the time, for its desperation to signal the 
constitutional superiority of the British parliament away from the realm. In an impassioned 
performance, his maiden speech, before the House of Commons at the start of March 1720, 
Yorke spoke in favour of the bill ‘for better securing the Dependency of the Kingdom of Ireland 
upon the Crown of Great Britain’. Passed, this declaratory statute would ultimately confirm 
that the island ‘is, and of Right ought to be subordinate unto and dependent upon the Imperial 
Crown of Great Britain, as being inseparably united and annexed thereunto’.12 Product of the 
labour of law officers present, it was championed by those in waiting.  
 
It would not be Ireland and the liberties of its people that consumed the more of Yorke’s 
attentions as solicitor general and then, after 1724, as attorney general. It would be Jamaica. 
By the criteria set out in Chief Justice John Holt’s jurisprudence between 1693 and 1705, 
Jamaica had been a ‘conquered colony’. That meant that it was not the common-law alternative, 
variously considered ‘new’, ‘uninhabited’, and ‘settled’, where the laws of England were 
carried with subjects automatically. Jamaica, by Blankard v Galdy (1693), and nuanced 
through Smith v Brown and Cooper (1705), was a conquered province where the laws of 
England did not automatically extend; instead, the laws were ‘what the king pleases’.13 Into 
the early eighteenth century, however, the constitutional consequences of this conquest were 
disputed by a growing number of merchants, planters, and inhabitants in Jamaica. They felt 
themselves the victims of an unlawful and arbitrary denial of complete access ‘to the benefit 
of the common and statute laws of England, as free-born subjects thereof’.14 So they might 
pass their own laws, then.  
 
Concessions of legislative autonomy to the colony since the Restoration had only been 
temporary, but they had been consecutive enough to give the indication of permanence. 
Eventually the limits of local legislative power were called into question over revenues. When 
puzzlement broke out in 1721 over the lifespan of a series of overlapping local revenue acts 
passed by the Jamaican assembly in 1683, 1688, and 1703, the Board of Trade turned to Yorke, 
along with the attorney general, Robert Raymond, for advice. Together they offered their take 
on the merits of the statutes, along with a note of encouragement, for the Jamaican legislature. 
Their message to the Jamaicans was to consolidate their laws afresh.15  
 
In this way was the next Jamaican revenue act, passed on February 5th, 1723, justified, but the 
new legislation would do far more than the law officers anticipated. Part of its problem 
stemmed from a confusing preamble that declared the colony to be founded both by conquest 
and settlement. Besides jumbling up concepts that were just developing into terms of art to 
gauge the legal receptivity of colonies, this extraordinary piece of legislation also presumed to 
decide which procedural elements of English law, including habeas corpus, might transfer 
from England to Jamaica.16 Aghast, the Board of Trade turned back to the law officers of the 
crown, because (among other things) the act of the Jamaican assembly seemed to raise old 
questions anew about the colony’s legislative autonomy relative to ‘its dependence upon the 
authority of the Crown of Great Britain’, issues about which Yorke had been famously 
outspoken in relation to Ireland.17 By this stage, promoted to attorney general, Yorke and the 
new solicitor general, Clement Wearg, had to consider ‘whether Jamaica is now to be 
considered merely as a colony of English subjects, or as a conquered country’, in relation to 
the application of taxes. The dichotomy they spelled out was plain:  
 
if, we apprehend, [Jamaica was] a colony of English subjects, they cannot be taxed, but 
by the Parliament of Great Britain, or by and with the consent of some representative 
body of the people of the island, properly assembled by the authority of the Crown; but, 
if it can now be considered as a conquered country, in that case, we conceive, they may 
be taxed by the authority of the Crown.18 
 
In this was the basic outline of a controversy about the operation of the imperial constitution 
which, in half a century’s time, would galvanise the thirteen American colonies into revolution. 
This is something the attorney general and the solicitor general could never have known, of 
course. Still they recognised in the question a matter ‘of great weight and importance’ for the 
wider Atlantic context, and therefore asked politely of the Board of Trade to provide more 
materials, so as ‘to enable us to judge’ on the matter. The validity of Cromwell’s original 
conquest from ‘the Crown of Spain’ in 1655 was no longer important. What raised ‘the chief 
difficulties’ were questions about different types of taxes, besides whether the Jamaican 
legislature enjoyed a perpetual or temporary existence. Hidden in all this were the makings of 
new criteria for colonial governments, which hinted at the principles of evolution from 
‘conquered’ to ‘settled’.19 Whatever the evidence (which went unsaid) in support of this 
interpretation (which was explicitly inconclusive), this was not binding law. Its importance lay 
in the future. 
 
Chief Justice of the King’s Bench from 1733, and Lord Chancellor from 1737, Hardwicke had 
a style of delivering equity, stylistically like facts, that attracted the awesome admiration of an 
ambitious chancery lawyer, William Murray, himself solicitor general from 1742. So came to 
be intertwined the destinies of two of the most outstanding lawyers of their generations. As a 
law officer of the crown, Murray refined his skills by following Hardwicke’s example, and he 
relished every chance to develop arguments before him. One of the cases bringing Murray and 
Hardwicke together was a drawn-out intergenerational dispute over boundaries between the 
Penns and the Baltimores. When, after 70 years of quarrelling, the matter came into the Court 
of Chancery, Murray appeared for the plaintiffs, the Penns. To the Penns, Hardwicke was 
ultimately more sympathetic in a decision so characteristic of the equity that Murray had come 
to admire: knotty with principles, choosy with precedents, and decisive when it came to the 
evaluation of old intentions. For all that Hardwicke appeared to side with the Penns, however, 
his judgment was one above all for the crown.20 
 
Like Yorke, Murray was able to get a sense of Atlantic legal controversies in advance of them 
reaching crisis point as a law officer of the crown. One such omen was Nova Scotian. Amid 
uncertainty about whether or not Governor Lawrence was obliged to establish an assembly in 
the Province, the Board of Trade asked Murray, now attorney general, along with the solicitor 
general, Richard Lloyd, to consider the validity of legislation passed by governor in council 
pending the installation of an assembly. In April 1755, the pair urged generally that the royal 
commissions and instructions heralding the creation of assemblies functioned to suspend 
gubernatorial legislative power until such an assembly be installed. Commissions and 
instructions for governors, the likes of which would be inspected if not drafted by law officers 
of the crown before their promulgation by the crown, had to be taken seriously for the 
provisions they carried, in Halifax no less than anywhere else in the Atlantic Empire, in other 
words.21 Murray and Lloyd gave nothing away about what logic or precedent allowed them to 
arrive at this interpretation. Ultimately their idea became a contentious rule of thumb for all 
placeholder administrations accrued by military victories during and after the Seven Years 
War, with a major exception for those in India, where the link between crown and corporation 
required different conventions of war and government.  
 
III. Conflicts of Arms and Interests in the Indies  
 
War was formally declared between Great Britain and France in 1756, and the hostilities would 
have important ramifications for both North America and India. One key difference between 
Atlantic and Indian theatres of the war, however, was the perceived independence of non-
European participants in the fighting. Whereas the French settlers in Quebec, for example, were 
able to ally the Algonquians to their side, as the English did the Iroquoians, indigenous 
participation in the war was subsidiary to that of the settlers, and was small in scale within the 
scope of the overarching cause. At least this is how things stood in comparison to south Asia. 
On the sub-continent, Indian communities, ever more sharply becoming disaggregated into 
ethno-religious groups, fostered sophisticated independent armies of their own.22  
 
Emerging as one of the East India Company’s main adversaries on the eve of the Seven Years 
War was the nawab of Bengal, Siraj ud-daula. In a violent act of protest against the company’s 
growing military presence following the Mutiny Act around Calcutta, the nawab seized Fort 
William in June of 1756. He would hold it for the next few months, just as the European conflict 
was spreading across the subcontinent. The fort was regained by British and company forces 
in early 1757, but bafflement followed about the division of spoils and the restoration of the 
fort itself. As the Battle of Plassey, which led to the capture and execution of Siraj ud-daula, 
got underway in June of 1757, news first reached the directors of the East India Company in 
London about the fresh uncertainties attending to Calcutta. Their alarm is easy to understand. 
Having parted with considerable wealth to put up a decent showing in the war, they now faced 
the prospect of being prevented from recuperating their losses. For this reason they petitioned 
the king to enquire ‘whether such Districts of Land, and the Plunder and Booty which may be 
conquered and taken by your Petitioners Forces upon any Occasion, either at Land or upon the 
Sea, […] belong unto your Majesty [or to the company]’.23  
 
This was perfect fodder for the law officers of the crown. The petition never reached the king; 
it fell upon the desk of William Pitt, who in turn passed it onto George Hay, the king’s advocate 
general, along with Charles Pratt (later Lord Camden), attorney general, and Charles Yorke 
(later Lord Morden, son of Hardwicke), solicitor general.24 Of them, it appears to have been 
Yorke who accepted chief responsibility for setting out four tenets of the ‘general Rules of Law 
and His Majesty’s Royal Prerogative’, on August 16, 1757: 
 
1st. That all such Places as are retaken, return to the old Dominion; and consequently 
[…] Calcutta, within the former territorial Limits, must be restored to the East India 
Company.  
 
2d. That all such Places, as may be newly conquested in this Expedition, accrue to the 
Sovereign, and are vested in His Majesty, by Right of Conquest. 
 
3d. That with respect to the moveable Goods retaken, the Property of all such was 
altered by the Capture, and totally lost in the original Owners [i.e. the company] […]; 
and consequently every Thing within that Description belongs to His Majesty […] 
 
4d. That by stronger Reason, all Moveables and Plunder of every Kind first taken and 
acquired from the Enemy. […] are vested in His Majesty […]25 
 
The third of these recommendations was most damning for the company. Alone it would have 
reduced it to an intractable position. These general customs were prefaced, however, by a 
suggestion that half of the booty taken at Fort St George be reserved for the company by the 
king. All was not lost, therefore. Ultimately this advice was heeded by the king-in-council, and 
two weeks later, Yorke and Pratt were directed by the sign-manual to prepare ‘a Bill for our 
Royal Signature’, to proclaim that one half (or ‘Moiety’) of all plunder and booty taken at 
Calcutta be set aside for the company, guaranteeing also, subject to the king’s consent, the 
return of some portion of those things retaken from crown subjects by the nawab.26 That a draft 
to this effect promptly informed a supplementary charter of September 19th suggests 
something of the heavy weight given to the opinion at the height of war.27  
 
The passage of the new charter was not sufficient to lay the matter entirely to rest. Weeks later 
in the middle of November, on the back of the capture of Chandannagar and the Battle of 
Plassey, Yorke and Pratt were referred another petition from the company with seven further 
questions about the division of plunder in the context of the war against France and the war 
against Siraj ud-daula.28 Increasingly, these were being considered as separate wars, with 
different rules applicable, both by the company and the offices of attorney and solicitor general. 
On this occasion, their rumination upon these queries would culminate in a far more detailed 
series of recommendations for the king, dated December 24th, 1757.  
 
Yorke and Pratt wished to expel all lingering doubts about the subdivision of prize, 
distinguishing, firstly, between campaigns conducted partially and wholly by the company, and 
secondly, between campaigns for recuperation and for gain.29 This they did succinctly and 
authoritatively, relative anyway to the second half of the report, where the authors were 
necessarily more circumspect and cautious. It was an unfamiliar task to probe the limits of 
corporate sovereignty in India and the foundational rights of the crown in extra-European 
territories contested by separate interests. This necessitated further reflection on the weight of 
past charters and the purpose of future charters. This approach is not all that surprising, for not 
only were company charters the only coherent sources of law specific to the questions at hand, 
but moreover, as legal instruments, they were more easily modified and reissued on their own 
advice than any unusual regulating bill might be drafted, debated, and passed at the height of 
war. It was sensible, in view of the company’s own constitution of charters, that a key proposal 
to emerge from the report was to confine the company to making captures within only those 
regions identified as their loci of trading operations within previous charters. But this came 
with a crucial qualification: this restriction would not apply to ‘such Places as have been, or 
shall be acquired by Treaty, or Grant from the Mogul, or any of the Indian Princes, or 
Governments’. For those acquisitions, the king’s letters patent could not prevent ‘the Property 
of the Soil vesting in the Company by the Indian Grants’ (‘subject only to Your Majesty’s 
Right of Sovereignty over the Settlements’).30 That left only the matter of war and restitution. 
The company’s right ‘to restore Conquests’, Yorke and Pratt suggested, was implied by ‘the 
Royal Charters’. But new conquests seemed to be, to them, of a different nature. There, ‘the 
Property, as well as the Dominion, vests in Your Majesty, by Virtue of Your known 
Prerogative’, and the only way for the company to ‘derive a Right to them [is] through Your 
Majesty’s Grant’.31 In other words, fair contracts vested title in the company (enjoyed, 
however, of the crown); but fair conquests vested title in the crown (from whom, only, could 
title originate). To this was added an important rider, which exposed just how novel and 
untested the East India Company’s position in the imperial constitution had become by this 
time: ‘that it is not warranted by Precedent, nor agreeable to sound Policy, nor to the Tenor of 
the Charters which have been laid before us, to make such a General Grant, not only of past, 
but of future contingent Conquests, made upon any Power, European or Indian, to a Trading 
Company’.32 Notwithstanding such reservations, it shows flexibility indeed that Yorke and 
Pratt would still wind off their report with a recommendation that a new clause be inserted into 
the next charter, ‘enabling [the company] to make Cessions of new Conquests’, in relation to 
its war against Siraj ud-daula. All that had to go with it was an express reservation that ‘any 
Settlements or Territories conquered from the Subjects of any European power’ went to the 
crown.33 Corporate wars were bad, but should be permitted, in other words. Once more, this 
was a recommendation consistent enough with the king’s feelings to find its way into letters 
patent prepared three weeks later, which made the explicit distinction between the company’s 
war ‘against the French’ and its war ‘against the Nabob of Bengal’.34  
 
These guidelines, percolated from the law officers of the crown into the charters, were observed 
close to the letter in India before doubts emerged, once more, at the outset of 1761. This 
followed a stand-off between the captain of the royal regiment at Madras, Eyre Coote, and the 
company’s former governor at Madras and president at Fort St George, George Pigot. Upon 
seizing the factory of Pondicherry from the French and their Indian allies, crown and company 
were once again estranged. Obedient to his briefs from London, Coote unquestionably 
presumed the fort to fall to the crown. But Pigot protested. As the company had been busy 
amplifying the claims of a rival nawab (who looked favourably, in return, upon the company), 
some thought the fort and its booty could divert straight to the company without first travelling 
through the crown.35 Yorke was a keen spectator throughout all this from London, but his 
interventions were never required. Coote, ‘[c]onceiving His Majesty’s Royal Prerogative to be 
insulted’, threatened the withdrawal of all support and supplies from the company at 
Pondicherry; this was enough to panic Pigot about the prospect of ‘answering to His Majesty 
for the Consequences’.36 The two made up, and their joint occupation of Pondicherry continued 
until its delivery to France in the Treaty of Paris in 1763. In relation to this and all of the other 
Asian conflicts that were part of the war from 1759 onwards, the solicitor general remained 
generally satisfied that all relevant guidelines relating to company acquisitions and the interests 
of the crown had been spelled out in the company charters for which he and Pratt had been 
indirectly responsible.37  
 
There was at least one scenario, about the legal effects of conquest, that these guidelines had 
not foreseen. Upon the triumphant return to England of Robert Clive, whose efforts had secured 
for the company so many of its gains during the course of the Seven Years War, another legal 
issue peculiar to south Asian circumstances surfaced. Throughout 1757, Clive had been a 
supporter of Mir Jafir’s claim to the throne of Siraj-ud-daula; Mir Jafir, upon becoming the 
new nawab, rewarded Clive with an annual salary (jagir) worth about £27,000 to commence in 
1759, which was understood, by Clive if nobody else, as a lifetime salary akin to a title of 
nobility held under the Bengali nawab. Within a few years, the directors of the company came 
to see this income differently. They desired the revenues to fall to the corporation, and so 
claimed the jagir from Clive’s agents in Calcutta. Clive, in response, asked the directors that 
he be able to retain this salary for ten years. When this was refused on April 27th, 1763, the 
matter went to law.38 
 
At first, Clive hoped to use the Court of Chancery to compel the company to reveal its accounts 
and profits in relation to the jagir. Rather than moving quickly with all documents into court, 
the directors instead approached two London solicitors for advice. They both suggested, by the 
end of the year, that Clive’s claim was bad and that the court had no jurisdiction anyway. This, 
at any rate, was the advice of the up-and-coming Edward Thurlow, who had just taken silk at 
the inner temple, but was not yet a law officer of the crown.39 Clive then did himself a service 
by delivering a letter to each of the proprietors, which he published as a pamphlet in early 1764, 
to rally support to his cause.40 Through this propaganda campaign, Clive was elected to the 
position of governor and commander-in-chief of Bengal in March of 1764. This position he 
accepted, but delayed to take up until the next election of directors was held in late April, for 
the new cohort, he thought, might be more favourable to him.  
 
Clive mobilised his best political contacts to support his claims upon the jagir at this time. One 
of these was Fletcher Norton, who had been attorney general in George Grenville’s ministry 
(1763-5), and solicitor general under Lord Bute’s before him (1762-3). Norton felt, contrary to 
Thurlow, that Chancery did have jurisdiction to hear the case, and so pressured the company 
to settle with Clive for the best terms.41 The second of these contacts was Charles Yorke, the 
attorney general before Norton, who said much the same thing as Norton did, if occasionally 
with greater confidence. For Yorke, there was ‘no doubt’ that the court would support Clive’s 
claim ‘to the rent or jaghire demanded’. This assertion was outfitted with an analogy drawn to 
the relations between grantor, payer, and grantee of rents in England.42 With two veteran law 
officers of the crown on his side, Clive had turned the tables. 
 
The directors of the company, in turn, sought advice from the best lawyers they could secure: 
John Dunning and James Eyre. Dunning, a few years off from accepting the position of solicitor 
general himself, felt that Clive had no case, but also felt that Chancery had no jurisdiction. 
Eyre, recently one of the counsel for John Wilkes in a high-profile case, rather expected that 
Chancery would accept jurisdiction only to award for the company and not the employee, an 
opinion he justified by way of recourse to conquest. ‘I am inclined to think that the Plaintiff’s 
true title is in the Sword’, he wrote, ‘but this he could not rest upon, because the benefit in that 
case, must go, according to the law of nations, to those whose sword it was’.43 It was plain that 
the ownership of the sword, for Eyre, fell to the company, but this ran in the opposite direction 
to contemporary official thought about conquest and the crown after 1757: swords were 
wielded by sovereigns, not subjects.  
 
In the end, the newly elected directors did come around to Clive’s side. Risking not only a 
decision against them in the Court of Chancery, but also a public relations disaster, they settled 
out of court on 16th May, 1764, and agreed to pay out the jagir for ten years.44 Past, present, 
and future attorney generals had sufficiently influenced the matter before the Lord Chancellor 
was ever required, in the end, to develop any rule at equity for this dispute and others like it.45  
 
Within weeks, Clive was back in India to oversee the expansion of the East India Company. 
From October 1764, company forces were turned upon disaffected ‘country powers’ formerly 
favoured by the French around Bengal. After securing key victories here, Clive then entered 
into treaties with the nawabs of Awadh and Bengal in August 1765, and subsequently accepted 
the role of diwan, controller of all revenues in Bengal, from the Mughal emperor, Shah Alam 
II, in return for reserves near Allahabad and an annual salary of approximately £325,000. This 
was gigantic in comparison to the jagir. Legally, once more, what just happened was for anyone 
to say. Clive made no personal claim for his part this time around. If all of this fell to the 
company, what interest, if any, did the crown have? Facing armed resistance in India, but at a 
time of peace for Europe, the corporation secured for itself through treaty an acquisition of 
unprecedented size on the back of petty wars. As diwan of Bengal, what the directors and 
proprietors of the East India Company regarded as a ‘right of a Civil Office which they exercise 
under the Mogul’, was estimated to yield a surplus value of some £2 million or more for the 
company revenue every year.46  
 
As the gravity of this acquisition came to be comprehended in Westminster over the course of 
the 1766, several members in the ministry (coalesced at first around Lord Chatham, and after 
October around Lord Grafton) were stirred into discussions about what came to be called, in a 
very public-law kind of way, ‘the territorial revenue’ of Bengal. They saw the diwan as a 
conquest which therefore fell to the crown by default, not to the company – an opinion which 
had the blessings of Lord Chancellor Camden, formerly Charles Pratt. Over and above the 
reasons for seeing this as a conquest and deferring thereby to the 1757 opinion, it was also 
taken into consideration that the charter of 1758 had only ever permitted the company, with 
the approbation of the king-in-council, to ‘cede’ and ‘restore’ new conquests from the country 
powers. It was also put forward that Shah Alam II had been brought into a definitive state of 
submission in 1764 by Hector Munro, a colonel holding a commission from the king whose 
troops generated the favourable treaty conditions from which Clive afterwards capitalised.47 
For these reasons combined, several in the ministry began to press for a ‘declaration of right’ 
to the ‘territorial revenues’ from late 1766.  
 
When the matter of Bengal revenues came before the House of Commons on April 14th, 1767, 
a new point of contention was debated: namely, whether or not the diwani income should be 
seen in terms of contract (or ‘treaty’) or otherwise in terms of conquest, and therefore, whether 
the revenues fell to the company or the crown, respectively, in accordance with the dichotomy 
spelled out by Yorke and Pratt way back in 1757. What made the question all the more 
interesting was the fresh difference of opinion between Yorke and Pratt on the applicability of 
that rule to these circumstances. The pair had never been close, but had grown more estranged 
upon Yorke taking his place among the Whigs in opposition. Law sat inside politics, not 
outside, over squabbles like this. Now Yorke took issue with Lord Chancellor Camden, when 
he favoured the interpretation that the diwani income fell to the company by treaty. Not 
everyone agreed. Fletcher Norton, no longer attorney general but hopeful somewhat of a 
comeback, threw his lot behind the ministry on the question. He saw ‘the territories’ as ‘the 
fruit of a successful war’, which therefore fell to the crown. If they had been acquired without 
the delegated prerogative powers of war and peace, Norton added, then the company was ‘no 
better than robbers and plunderers’, and ‘their conquest […] ought to be returned to the country 
powers’. Yorke, who likewise found himself in-between appointments, responded with a list 
of precedents at common law which revealed that the crown and the company might defer their 
case to the courts for resolution. The best way to go about this was to present an information 
against the company to show its profits. Until such time, Yorke admitted that ‘right of the India 
Company to their possession’ was good. This was because Bengal, like other parts of India, 
had fallen to the company, ‘not from the effect of our arms’, but rather with the ‘gratitude’ of 
local rulers, which was all very different to the Atlantic.48 
 
IV. Crisis after Conquest in the Atlantic  
 
Addressing the diverse inhabitants of his new acquisitions in the Caribbean and North America, 
George III issued a royal proclamation on 7th October, 1763.49 Edited by the law officers of 
the crown, this advertised some of the practical consequences immediately entailed by the 
imposition of British sovereignty, and heralded the introduction of new governments, in a 
gesture of the ‘will’ and ‘pleasure’ of the king. It did little more than lay out a series of 
guidelines, however, the obedience of the king’s subjects to which would be secured by a series 
of dispatched officials on royal commissions while everyone anticipated more considered 
policies for specific application in due course.50  
 
When confusion surfaced about the reception of English laws, concerns were most pronounced 
in the province of Quebec. French Canada brought the law officers of the crown, past and 
present, into play. William Murray, now Lord Mansfield as Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, 
was disturbed enough at the tenor of conversations on Canada to address his friend, Grenville, 
in an especially frank letter of December 1764:  
 
Is it possible that we have abolished their laws, and customs, and forms of judicature 
all at once? – a thing never to be attempted or wished. The history of the world do[es]n’t 
furnish an instance of so rash and unjust an act by any conqueror whatsoever: much 
less by the Crown of England, which has always left to the conquered their own laws 
and usages, with a change only so far as the sovereignty was concerned. […] For God’s 
sake learn the truth of the case, and think of a speedy remedy.  
 
As Mansfield explained to Grenville, the ‘fundamental maxims’ were, firstly, ‘that a country 
keeps her own laws, till the conqueror expressly gives new’, and, secondly, that English settlers 
‘in a waste country’, may enjoy ‘such part of the laws of England as is adapted to, and proper 
for their situation’. The problem was, as Mansfield knew, the presumption that such a rule was 
straightforward in every circumstance. Certainly never, in Mansfield’s mind, could the anti-
Catholic legislation of England be seen in any way as appropriate for Quebec, for example; a 
hard-line interpretation left no room for discretion, however.51 
 
Concerns of this kind became more widespread after the disbandment of the Grenville ministry. 
When, in April 1766, then-attorney general, Yorke, with the help of the solicitor general, 
William de Grey, filed a detailed report for the Board of Trade on the civil government of 
Canada, they agreed almost to the letter with Mansfield on these ‘maxims’ of the common law. 
Yet still the pair endorsed the radical overhaul of the judiciary, accompanied by the 
introduction of English criminal law but the retention of French civil law.52 This implied a 
change of policy that was unsavoury to some in the cabinet (none more incensed than Lord 
Chancellor Northington), and the proposed reforms stalled.53  
 
Members in the Commons were distracted, at this time, with what they felt to be a bigger 
question: how to deal with American dissatisfaction over the Stamp Act. Much of this 
conversation, along with the solution, was a throwback to the solicitor-generalship of Philip 
Yorke, representing a fusion of Jamaican and Irish problems felt nearer the outset of the 
Hanoverian period. In statutory language can the voice of law officers, past and present, be 
made out with some clarity, if one is trained to look for it. Responding to the defiance, ‘against 
Law’, of colonists claiming exemption from duties and taxes of its imposition, the Declaratory 
Act (1766) confirmed that the ‘Colonies and Plantations in America have been, are, and of 
Right ought to be, subordinate unto, and dependent upon, the Imperial Crown and Parliament 
of Great Britain’. Like the act for Ireland (1720) upon which this one for America was based, 
no mention of conquest was necessary in order to declare that the king-in-parliament enjoyed 
‘full Power and Authority to make Laws and Statutes of sufficient Force and Validity to bind 
the Colonies and People of America, Subjects of the Crown of Great Britain, in all Cases 
whatsoever’.54 It further befits the narrative of this article to note that, whereas for the Irish 
occasion, it had been Philip Yorke who showed off his mastery of the law to defend the right 
of parliament to do as it wanted in Ireland, this time, it was his old protégé, Mansfield, who 
played an identical part. Mansfield took it upon himself to spell out to the House of Lords that 
the statute books could be trawled for hundreds of laws applicable to Calais, the Isle of Man, 
and elsewhere, regardless of whatever rules could be said to attach to ‘conquest’. And this 
power applied to America too, Mansfield thundered.55  
 
Parliament was therefore satisfied of the subordination of the American colonists to the 
imperial parliament, and of their dependency on the crown, to enact further legislation 
applicable to them. The clearest indication of this came in a handful of laws passed in 1767 
introducing new taxes on imports and organising for commissioners to collect revenues. 
Inspiring protests, pamphlets, and petitions in America, these statutes also led to the installation 
of a specialised ministerial portfolio, the ‘secretary of state for the colonies’, to supervise the 
implementation of these and other legislative initiatives for the colonies.56 The duties quickly 
proved too unpopular to retain, and moves got underway from 1770 in the House of Commons 
to repeal them. In a compromise, parliament retained duties on one ‘luxury item’, tea.57 A 
tactlessly antagonistic consequence of this, however, was the competitive advantage it 
provided to the East India Company over domestic merchants and smugglers in America. That 
made the corporation play its role as imperial scapegoat at Griffin’s Wharf.58  
 
The point of this digression is to show how paradoxical frontier politics could often be, and 
moreover how strange the applications of law-officer opinion could become, in this context. 
The East India Company’s consignees were maligned from October 1773 in newspapers and 
on the bulletin boards of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston. But the company 
was held up as an exemplar in the west of the Appalachians and the south of the Great Lakes 
by land speculators like Samuel Wharton, George Croghan, and George Washington.59 With 
hopes fading, among aspirational colonial proprietors, of securing great chunks of crown land 
at the source, entrepreneurs of this kind began to ache for ways of acquiring land that did not 
require the consent of the British government in the early 1770s.60 The most pressing problem 
faced by American land companies, of course, was the crown’s claim to pre-emptive rights of 
purchasing, if not disposing, Indian lands (as Murray, as attorney general, had reminded the 
Privy Council in 1754, and as was later re-advertised in the Royal Proclamation of 1763).61 An 
inventive means of skirting this convention was to resurrect the 1757 opinion of Yorke and 
Pratt, holding contracts to vest title in the company, and conquests to vest title in the crown. 
Culled of its wider considerations about coordinating crown and company armies for 
perceivably separate wars against Frenchmen and Bengalis, the original report of the law 
officers was abridged and sent across the Atlantic where it was misarticulated in a great game 
of Chinese whispers. Conquest had no part to play in this apparently ‘true Copy’ of the 1757 
report made in April 1772.62 As irrelevant as the prospect of corporate warfare had become to 
the American context in this period, still this ‘most respectable opinion’ came to represent, if 
only to misled enthusiasts, a rendition of the firmest principles of English law applicable to the 
Indian lands.63 
 
V. Revenue and Reform in India64 
 
By the time the question of the East India Company’s territorial acquisitions through treaty and 
conquest returned to the House of Commons in March of 1773, the issue had succumbed to the 
hurly-burly of factional politics.65 This gave the flight of shuttlecocks to sundry old opinions 
of the law officers. It was the prime minister, Lord North, who set the standard in response to 
a prepared statement of William Dowdeswell that the crown had no right to interfere in Asia.66 
‘Sir, many men’, he declared, ‘far my superior in abilities, in learning, and knowledge of the 
laws, have declared […] that such territorial possessions as the subjects of any state shall 
acquire by conquest, are virtually the property of the state, and not of those individuals who 
acquire them’. Bashfully, he admitted that he was ‘only reciting the opinion of others as well 
as myself’, although he failed to specify specifically which law officers of the crown he was 
favouring. This kind of doffing to the sanctity of law-officer opinion was popular in the 
Commons. For another example, George Dempster, a Scottish proprietor in the company, 
waded into the dispute by noting that ‘[s]everal gentlemen, well skilled in the laws of their 
country, have advanced it as their opinion, that the Company have an undoubted, a clear, and 
an exclusive right to the territories possessed in India, whether acquired by conquest, or 
otherwise’. Dempster too levelled nothing of juridical substance though, before parting with 
the searing accusation that ‘a gentleman in my eye’, one recently placed ‘in office’, had 
changed his mind on the question upon switching factions (none other than Fletcher Norton, 
speaker of the House of Commons from 1770).67 Eventually, the Member for Cockermouth, 
George Johnstone of the British Navy, returned to ‘the territorial acquisitions’ of the company 
in this way:  
 
A late chancellor [Yorke/Morden], I remember, who did honour to the post he occupied, 
declared himself in favour of the Company's exclusive right of territory. However, this 
is not the place for such points to be determined. As trustees for the public, we are 
parties concerned, and cannot decide in the public’s favour against the Company. 
Westminster-hall is the place for such decisions.68  
 
Two weeks later and another proposal to regulate the financial affairs of the company was 
tabled, finally inciting Edmund Burke to speech on the matter, who lacked nothing, true to 
character, in oratorical spirit. Part of his performance involved reading from a document which 
contained the opinions of two former law officers of the crown: one, likely Charles Yorke, 
which posited that the diwan was akin to a Bengali ‘office’, and the other, likely William de 
Grey, which posited that the crown had no legal claim to the territories but that it should claim 
them anyway. These he read disingenuously, only to make a spectacle of the opacity and 
contradiction of legal thinking on the issue, if ironically to prepare the way for his own view 
that the crown had ‘no right’ to anything in India, regardless of how the company had come 
into its source of revenues.69 Norton was offended at this. He answered Burke by reading from 
a document of his own: the 1757 opinion of Yorke and Pratt. This he repeated before admitting 
to have become uncertain about the rules of conquest in application to trading companies, 
shying away from the finer points of the matter in want, he said, of more information.70  
 
When the ministry back-flipped, with the resolution of the Commons that the territories should 
‘remain’ in the possession of the company, it fell to present law officers of the crown, and not 
past ones, to explain why.71 This was inspired by the introduction of three general resolutions 
into the House by General Burgoyne, which included the addition of yet more concepts into 
the constitutional categories at play in the dispute: 
 
1. That all acquisitions, made under the influence of a military force, or by treaty with 
foreign princes, do of right belong to the state. 
 
2. That to appropriate acquisitions so made, to the private emolument of persons 
entrusted with any civil or military power of the state, is illegal. 
 
3. That very great sums of money, and other valuable property, have been acquired in 
Bengal, from princes, and others of that country, by persons intrusted with the military 
and civil powers of the state; which sums of money and other valuable property have 
been appropriated to the private use of such persons.72 
 
Speeches then followed, which were carried away with the feelings of shame that ran hard, in 
this period, against Clive. Responding, the solicitor general, Alexander Wedderburn, was 
nothing if not idiosyncratic by his complaint that the committee’s findings were not ‘manly’ 
enough to inspire any serious regulations. Worst of all (‘nugatory and ridiculous’) was the 
imprecision of legal language in the first resolution: 
 
To what time does this go? To what period? At what place? and in what quarter of the 
world? […] And then “belong to the state!” What is the state? The hon. Gentlemen says 
that he does not decide what the state is; he leaves it for future discussions: but, Sir, 
what does this mean? It is impossible you should vote it; because it decides the right of 
the crown to the territorial possessions, which you have already put off for six years, if 
you say the state; or if you say the Company is the state […] But, Sir, this motion gives 
to the state acquisitions, which beyond all reasonable doubt do of right belong to the 
individual; for it makes no distinction, the words “under the influence” is so 
unlimited.73  
 
On this day, and with these very remarks of Wedderburn, the legalese about the East India 
Company in parliament changed. No longer would any distinction between treaty or conquest 
matter to the members of North’s parliament. Every ‘event’, as the attorney general Thurlow 
explained, was ‘the same in all’.74 While Thurlow (who was deeply critical of the company) 
may have been speaking against Wedderburn (who stood behind it) here, the pair seem to have 
been of one mind that it was now time to move away from the dichotomy first spelled out by 
Yorke and Pratt in 1757.  
 
The distancing of parliament from these criteria was associated with moves to collapse the 
question of the company’s acquisitions into a scandal far more befitting the chastisement of 
the Commons: one about employee emoluments, about private gain rather than corporate gain, 
about the ‘public’ conduct of the company’s appointments in India, about Clive and others of 
his type. And these were finally the issues to attract more aggressive legislative interventions 
from the House of Commons (if greater trepidation, as a result, in the House of Lords). While 
some, like Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, expressed concern about the 
abuse of ‘legislative power’ that these moves appeared to represent, a majority in both 
chambers, in the end, came around to the need for parliament to intervene.75  
 
The East India Company’s final and pitiful act of defiance before submitting to the statutory 
stranglehold of the government was a petition requesting all previous petitions be withdrawn. 
These they asked to be replaced with a request for the ‘legal decision’ by which parliament had 
reached the conclusion that the crown enjoyed some right to the territorial acquisitions, for it 
was this ‘pretended source’, the directors continued, from which ‘the undue interposition and 
the various oppressions […] have flowed’.76 All this inspired were a few murmurs in the 
Commons, none of which from mouths of the king’s law officers. That left nothing in the way 
of a regulating bill, introduced by Lord North on May 18th, becoming an act of parliament on 
June 21st, 1773.77  
 
VI. War and Government in Quebec and Grenada  
 
Placing Quebec in the imperial constitution asked different things of law officers of the crown 
during the early 1770s. Distress about the governance and administration of law in the province 
of Quebec after the Royal Proclamation of 1763 circled around five issues: the composition of 
the legislature, the extent of gubernatorial powers, the coexistence of French civil law and 
English criminal law, the practicality of harmonising the laws of real property, and the 
provision of religious liberty to Roman Catholic subjects. In preparation for these ambiguities 
to be addressed by an act of parliament, the advice of the solicitor general and the attorney 
general was requested late in 1772.  
 
Emphatic about different things, still the pair were of the same mind in one aspect. In his report 
of December 6th, Wedderburn implied a need to modernise the meaning of conquest to have 
use ‘in more civilized times, when the object of war is dominion’. Doing so entailed a greater 
distinction between ‘force’ and ‘right’, in favour of an understanding of conquest based on a 
right that can be expressed while preserving as many of the ‘privileges’ of conquered subjects 
as may be possible.78 Thurlow, while admitting to some confusion about the theories of 
conquest in circulation relating to Quebec, likewise appeared to favour a benign theory of 
conquest (something he attributes more so, however, to ‘the law of nations and treaties’, than 
to English legal principles).79 How far that may be applicable to these circumstances is not 
entirely spelled out, with Thurlow instead using his report to distance himself from the 
interpretation of his predecessors, Yorke and de Grey. In particular, Thurlow disagreed with 
their distinction between Canadian civil law and English criminal law (which he considered 
arbitrary in discussions about conquest).80 The question was even referred to the king’s 
advocate general, who likewise developed an opinion and drafted a series of bills. Ultimately, 
these were mostly overlooked in favour of Wedderburn’s proposals, which made their way to 
the colonial secretary, Lord Dartmouth.81 For the whole of 1773 and the first part of 1774, 
Dartmouth worked on three different draft versions of a bill. It is fair to say he struggled to 
correlate the observations of Wedderburn with those of Lord Mansfield, all while appearing to 
address the wishes of cabinet, and sorting through the petitions from Quebec: this was work 
more befitting of a nineteenth-century colonial office undersecretariat than a lone, eighteenth-
century colonial secretary.82  
 
The resultant bill was first presented to the House of Lords on May 2nd, 1774, and passed 
without much dissent. A divided House of Commons was sterner in opposition and presented 
the bigger challenge for Lord North and his law officers Wedderburn and Thurlow. It was the 
serjeant-at-law John Glynn who took it upon himself to oppose Thurlow in particular on the 
ramifications of conquest. For Glynn, it was ideal that all new conquests ‘vested in the King, 
Lords, and Commons’, but this could only be achieved once parliament had ‘interfered’. This 
was an argument for a literal reading of a provision in the Royal Proclamation guaranteeing to 
all new subjects the benefit of English laws and customs, and it was a point made by way of 
comparison to Wales and Ireland (places ‘conquered’ where ‘our laws had been established’).83 
Wedderburn responded. The conquests of Wales and Ireland did not automatically introduce 
the laws of England there upon conquest, he said; rather, that had been the accomplishments 
of parliaments called by Henry VIII and James I/VI. It was ‘a cruel and barbarous policy’, the 
solicitor general concluded, to impose foreign laws upon ‘the conquered’ without any degree 
of compromise.84 Other points of disagreement for participants in the debate on the Quebec bill 
in the Commons concerned lines of demarcation and the introduction of habeas corpus and 
oaths for officeholders, divisions which were gradually ironed out for the bill to pass into law 
on June 22nd.85 The resultant Quebec Act (1774) introduced a mixed legal system and provided 
for the religious liberty of Catholics.86  
 
That Mansfield should have taken particular interest in the Quebec bill throughout April, a 
month before it was presented to both houses of parliament, can of course be explained by its 
relevance to a trial scheduled to begin at the Court of King’s Bench shortly after this. Pleas had 
been entered in London throughout 1773, and arguments first made during the Easter term of 
1774, concerning affairs in the ‘ceded island’ of Grenada, which, being Christian though 
Catholic and conquered after 1763, fell somewhat into the same boat as Quebec. Important to 
this particular case was not the applicability of statutory law, but rather the issue of prerogative 
taxation. When the planter, Alexander Campbell, brought an action to recover the amount paid 
to a crown customs officer, he proposed to call the king’s jurisdictional bluff, and in the process 
demanded a special verdict that would finally expose what conquest should entail for king and 
parliament in the British Empire and, more importantly, how new conquests compared to the 
old ones. Only in some ways relevant to the unfolding American constitutional crisis about the 
imposition of taxation, Campbell v Hall (1774) also raised issues surrounding the personal 
prerogatives of the conqueror, as king, in relation to his role in parliament. Part of this involved 
the question of what conquest entailed, and for whom; part of this involved the question of how 
royal proclamations, instructions, and letters were to be interpreted by colonial governors 
addressed by them.  
 
The attorney general, Thurlow, made important contributions towards the end of the trial, but 
really it was Mansfield in control. Judgment for the plaintiff on 28th November was noticeably 
more consistent with the opinions of law officers than the relevant precedents of common law 
from between 1608 and 1705.87 Indeed, Mansfield’s report went somewhat further than was 
strictly necessary, taking the chance, as all the major Chief Justices of the King’s Bench had 
before him, to offer a ruling thick with dicta.88 In six conclusions, Mansfield sketched out the 
platform for a new and improved doctrine of conquest within the imperial constitution:  
 
1st, A country conquered by the British arms becomes a dominion of the king in right 
of his crown, and therefore necessarily subject to the legislative power of the parliament 
of Great Britain. 
 
2dly, The conquered inhabitants once received into the conqueror’s protection become 
subjects […] 
 
3dly, Articles of capitulation upon which the conquest is surrendered, and treaties of 
peace by which it is ceded, are sacred and inviolable, according to their true intent. 
 
4thly, The law and legislation of every dominion equally affects all persons and 
property within the limits thereof, and is the true rule for the decision of all questions 
which arise there […] 
 
5thly, Laws of a conquered country continue until they are altered by the conqueror 
[…] 
 
6thly, If the king has power (and, when I say the king, I mean in this case to be 
understood “without concurrence of parliament”) to make new laws for a conquered 
country, this being a power subordinate to his own authority, as a part of the supreme 
legislature in parliament, he can make none which are contrary to fundamental 
principles; none excepting from the laws of trade or authority of parliament, or 
privileges exclusive of his other subjects.89 
 
It was Mansfield’s clarification of the relationship between crown, parliament, and colonial 
legislatures that would give Campbell v Hall its relevance into the bureaucratic era of colonial 
officialdom and commissions of enquiry.90 In two royal proclamations and a commission to 
the governor issued before the imposition of the royal tax for which Campbell sought his 
refund, the king had heralded a local legislature and thereby inadvertently divested himself of 
his personal powers to raise a tax in the process. In basic outline, that meant the king’s power 
to create laws by his prerogative alone was disqualified by his earlier endorsement of the 
installation of a legislative assembly for Grenada. Thereupon only such laws as were passed 
by the imperial parliament, and those passed subordinately ‘by the assembly with the governor 
and council’, were valid in conquered countries.  
 
Mansfield would never dare cite his own opinion from 1755 in support of his preferred way of 
reading royal proclamations drawn up by law officers. Instead, he relied upon that hesitant and 
noncommittal motion of Yorke and Wearg, from 1724, upon the legal receptivity of 
legislatively autonomous Jamaica. Now this was not, by any strict definition, law, nor indeed 
was the opinion even developed with places like Grenada in mind. But Mansfield did not care. 
Yorke and Wearg, he said, must have been thinking that Jamaica was not conquered after all, 
but instead complied with the criteria of a ‘new’ or ‘uninhabited’ colony; therefore, the old 
opinion of the law officers of the crown was relevant not only to Grenada specifically, but also 
relevant to new and forthcoming cessions more widely.91  
 
Few assessments of Mansfield’s choosiness and interpretative freedom when it came to his 
sources of law in Campbell v Hall (1774) ever made it into print that were as scathing as Jeremy 
Bentham’s Plea for the Constitution (1803). And insofar as legal history entails the art of 
restraining from passing judgment on those who passed judgment, space can still be allowed 
for wide-eyed critics of the period, few better than Bentham, to appraise for us instead. For 
Bentham was able to see, better than probably anyone writing in the ‘meridian’, the 
imperfections that resulted from the piecing together of an imperial constitution by careerist 
officeholders, politicised parliamentarians, and judges with experience as both. For Bentham, 
conquest should never have become so suggestive of all these administrative conventions in 
the first place. That it did so was the ‘mistake’ of ‘his Majesty’s careless servants’, in their 
needless gesturing towards the establishment of colonial legislatures in conquered Grenada, 
when framing the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Upon the merits of this singular ‘error’ was 
Campbell v Hall brought to Lord Mansfield’s consideration. Before this, Bentham 
acknowledged, only out-of-date dicta and a ‘non-judicial opinion’ of crown law officers 
pointed to some right of the crown to legislate without parliament over an English colony 
regardless of the method of its acquisition. To Bentham it all reeked of a conspiracy between 
the king’s ‘law servants’ and a few ‘audacious crown-lawyers’, who were all seemingly out ‘to 
oust parliament of its rights’, by drafting royal instructions, and then uniting behind a literalistic 
and positivistic reading of those documents in court.92  
 
VII. The Imperial Constitution of the Law Officers of the Crown  
 
War and colonial government were matters of state of the highest importance. In contemplation 
of their legal aspects, some inconsistency and a bit of flexibility could sometimes be helpful in 
the shaping of an imperial constitution. And so it was, before the onset of a more ‘orderly’ 
period in 1801 – when roaming law commissioners and calculating colonial office 
undersecretarial assistants emerge onto the scene – that the British Empire was governed on 
the basis of consecutive decisions made by individuals faced with new and unfamiliar crises. 
Among such individuals, the attorney general and solicitor general were key figures between 
1719 and 1774, although the same might be said for a range between 1661 and 1931.93 Charged 
with convincing the courts and the parliament both that whatever policies towards the colonies 
and plantations had been deemed, often by themselves, fittest to adopt were consonant with 
established constitutional principles and also in the interest of the crown in one or other of its 
capacities, their roles were most peculiar. Here was a very specific mandate. And its impact 
upon the governance of the British Empire manifested in a number of different ways, as this 
article has proposed to show in relation to conquests abroad. 
 
In 1724, the attorney general and the solicitor general offered no precedents or principles to 
support an equivocal suggestion that concessions of legislative autonomy to colonial 
administrations impeded the powers of the prerogative in relation to those administrations. 
Alone that would have been difficult to interpret were it not for the admixture of certain legal 
principles handpicked without attribution from the jurisprudence of conquest. Fifty years later, 
this became one of the most important sources of law behind Lord Mansfield’s decision in 
Campbell v Hall (1774), a decision which pointed the common law world towards a direction 
that would not be paved out properly until a new cohort of cessions were collected from the 
purse of Napoleon.  
 
In 1757, the attorney general and solicitor general offered no precedents or principles to hold 
that conquests and treaties performed in foreign jurisdictions conferred different kinds of 
benefits upon the subjects carrying them out on behalf of the crown. While this opinion 
subsequently informed the substance of royal charters, it showed itself to be less adaptable to 
those debates inspired by Indian affairs within parliament about the justness of intervening into 
the affairs of the corporation. It was discovered during the course of the decade between 1763 
and 1773 that the criteria set out in the 1757 opinion had problems. For one thing, it was too 
rigid to be of any practical use. For another thing, it hinged far too much on an interpretative 
capacity, found lacking by anyone in a parliament stacked with vested interests, to distinguish 
between modes of acquisition in India. Just as the solicitor general and the attorney general 
began to turn their back on the report of their predecessors, parliamentarians chose to reframe 
their line of questioning about India in response to the reports of select and secret committees. 
In this way, the parameters of the debate surrounding the East India Company were changed 
entirely. It is quirky that, while all of this was happening, the discarded report of Yorke and 
Pratt was given new life by American land companies for a few years. Woe was it, though, for 
them, that its tenets were so soon irrelevant in the new constitutional predicament of the early 
Republic, whatever the later efforts of American judges to breathe new life into them. 
 
In 1766, the attorney general and solicitor general offered no precedents or principles to justify 
the post bellum distinction between French civil law and English criminal law in relation to 
conquered Quebec. When, six years later, a new administration was forced to consider again 
its obligations towards Quebec as a conquered province, this time, during a process of drafting 
and editing a bill for Quebec throughout 1773 and early 1774, the new solicitor general’s 
standalone advice was heeded more faithfully than that which had been offered by his 
colleagues. The input of the king’s law officers, past and present, into the resultant Quebec Act 
(1774) was weighty. That they all differed so widely on certain key questions, and therefore, 
that the statute represented a mutation of all these opinions, might go some way to explain its 
short lifespan. 
 
To observe all of this is emphatically not to make the argument that the attorney general and 
the solicitor general were the only ones shaping the imperial constitution in the eighteenth 
century. It is not to argue that they were winging it. It is not to argue that they were conspiring 
to ‘oust parliament of its rights’, or anything else of similar sensation. The argument here is for 
constitutional historians of the British Empire and later Commonwealth to become more aware 
of the motivations of individuals who, upon developing legalistic opinions, then presented 
these opinions as a positive kind of law. Scholars focusing upon the historical experiences of 
Ireland, India, America, Canada, or the Caribbean can all be forgiven for making out the 
utterances and benedictions of law officers to be ‘rulings’ and ‘judgments’; after all, those 
individuals we are studying, like Murray, flicking the switches and turning the knobs of high 
government in the judiciary or parliament, often felt like their opinions were akin to ‘rulings’ 
and ‘judgments’. It may be tempting for us to say, like Bentham, that they were wrong to do 
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